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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF 
VS . 
PEGGY B. 
UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, ] 
JOHNSON, 1 
Defendant/Respondent. 
i RESPONSE TO PETITION 
I FOR REHEARING 
i Case No. 
i Category 
900088 
No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The sole issue presented by the petitioner in this 
Petition for Rehearing is whether the court misinterpreted UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-101(3)(b) and 76-5-202(1)(n) (1990) and 
overlooked State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah 1989), in 
reversing defendant's conviction of Attempted First Degree Murder 
based on the administration of oxalic acid to her husband. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of this Petition, this court's statement of 
the case is generally sufficient: 
Defendant Peggy B. Johnson was charged with three 
separate counts of attempted first degree murder of her 
husband, Danny Johnson, and one count of distribution of 
a controlled substance for value. With respect to the 
attempted murder charges, count I charged an attempt to 
use heroin to cause her husband's death, and counts II 
and III charged attempts to use, respectively, 
amphetamines and oxalic acid to achieve the same end. 
Johnson was found guilty on all three counts and was also 
found guilty of distribution of a controlled substance 
for value. She was sentenced to three concurrent prison 
terms of five years to life. 
State v. Johnson, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3-4 (S. Ct. 1991). On 
appeal, the court affirmed the conviction of Attempted First Degree 
Murder on Count I, but reversed the convictions for the same 
offense on Counts II and III. In addition, the Court ordered that 
a judgment of conviction on the lesser included offense of 
Attempted Second Degree Murder be entered against the defendant. 
Id. at 8. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts pertinent to this Petition are well marshalled 
in the court's opinion: 
Johnson also challenges her conviction under count 
III, which alleges that she attempted to kill her husband 
by administering oxalic acid. As with count II, the 
State must have proven the requisite mental state, the 
requisite conduct, and the requisite aggravating 
circumstance. As to the first element, there is 
sufficient evidence to show that Johnson had the 
requisite state of mind. Johnson indicated to Orozco 
that she had given her husband an entire bottle of oxalic 
acid in small doses in his ampicillin capsules. Johnson 
made this statement during a conversation with Orozco in 
which they were discussing how large a dose of heroin 
would be fatal. The jury could certainly infer from 
these statements and others that Johnson had made about 
failed attempts to poison her husband that Johnson 
administered the oxalic acid with the necessary intent or 
knowledge. 
As for the second element of the attempt charge, the 
question is whether the evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury's finding that Johnson's conduct 
constituted a substantial step toward the commission of 
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murder. There is no question that there was evidence 
sufficient to show that Johnson actually administered the 
oxalic acid to her husband. Johnson's statements about 
giving her husband an entire bottle of the substance in 
his ampicillin capsules was corroborated by the officers' 
discovery of oxalic acid under the sink at her home and 
tests run on the ampicillin capsules that showed them to 
contain oxalic acid. That fact is sufficient to support 
a finding of the conduct element of an attempted 
intentional killing. 
The final issue to be addressed is the sufficiency 
of the evidence of the aggravating circumstances 
necessary to raise the murder attempted from second 
degree to first. The aggravating circumstances charged 
were (i) attempting to kill by administration of oxalic 
acid, which was either (a) a "poison" or "a lethal 
substance" or (b) "a substance administered in a lethal 
amount, dosage or quantity". . . . Utah Code Ann. §76-5-
202(1)(n). . . . We will deal first with the two-fold 
issue presented by the oxalic acid. . . . 
Respecting the oxalic acid, the State did not prove 
the first of the so-called poison alternatives, i.e., it 
did not demonstrate that oxalic acid is a poison or a 
lethal substance. There was evidence that oxalic acid in 
some unspecified amount may kill, but there was also 
evidence that oxalic acid is produced naturally by the 
body in small amounts. This state of the evidence is 
insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that oxalic acid is a poison or a lethal substance. 
The State's second poison alternative was to prove 
that the oxalic acid was administered or attempted to be 
administered in a "lethal amount, dosage, or quantity." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202 (n) . The problem with the 
State's case is that there was no showing at trial as to 
the quantity of oxalic acid that would constitute a 
lethal dose, much less that Johnson attempted to 
administer such an amount. 
The State responds that under the attempt statute, 
failure to demonstrate the lethality of the dosage of 
oxalic acid administered or attempted to be administered 
cannot bar a conviction for an attempted first degree 
murder. The State relies on section 76-4-101(3)(b), 
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which provides that no defense to a prosecution for 
attempt arises ,f[d]ue to factual or legal impossibility 
if the offense could have been committed had the 
attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them 
tobe." Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(3)(b) (1990). We agree 
that under this statute factual impossibility generally 
is no defense to an attempt charge. However, where the 
charge is attempted first degree murder, which is 
distinguishable under section 76-5-202(1) from attempted 
second degree murder only by the presence of specified 
objective aggravating circumstances, the legislature must 
have intended that the aggravating circumstance actually 
be present. Therefore, a subjective mistake by the actor 
as to the presence if an aggravating circumstance 
required by section 76-5-202(1) would be a defense to a 
charge of attempted first degree murder. Under such 
circumstances, the factor can be convicted only of an 
attempted intentional killing—attempted second degree 
murder. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that because the 
State failed to prove either that oxalic acid is a poison 
or a lethal substance or that Johnson administered or 
attempted to administer a quantity of the acid that would 
have been lethal, a conviction for attempted first degree 
murder could not be supported on the basis of proof of 
the aggravating circumstances described in section 76-5-
202(l)(n). 
State v. Johnson, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 6-7 (S. Ct. 1991) 
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This court properly concluded that the Utah legislature 
must have intended that the aggravating circumstances enumerated in 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1) actually be present in order to 
support a conviction of attempted first degree murder. In reaching 
that conclusion, the court did not overlook UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-
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101 (1990) and State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1985). Because 
the court neither overlooked nor misapplied relevant law, the 
instant Petition for Rehearing is not well founded and should be 
dismissed. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate only when the 
court has misinterpreted or overlooked the relevant law. See 
Cummins v. Nielsen, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). 
As respondent will demonstrate, this court has neither 
misinterpreted nor overlooked relevant law. Therefore, this 
Petition for Rehearing is not properly before the court and should 
be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
The crux of this Petition for Rehearing is that factual 
or legal impossibility is no defense under the Utah attempt 
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1990). See Petition for 
Rehearing, at 3. Respondent does not quarrel with the soundness of 
this proposition. Indeed, this court "agreed that under th[e 
attempt] statute factual impossibility generally is no defense to 
an attempt charge." Johnson, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7. Petitioner, 
however, attempts to elevate that proposition to an illogical 
level. It has argued that, because impossibility is no defense to 
- 5 -
an attempt charge, the state is obviated from proving each and 
every element of attempted first degree murder. 
As this court correctly notes, attempted first degree 
murder requires the state to prove, inter alia, presence of an 
aggravating factor -- here a poison or lethal substance, or a 
substance administered in a lethal dosage or quantity. See id., at 
6; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203(1) (n) (1990). Petitioner does not 
attack this court's finding and conclusion that the state's 
evidence was "insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that oxalic acid is a poison or a lethal substance" and "that 
there was no showing at trial as to the quantity of oxalic acid 
that would constitute a lethal dose, much less that Johnson 
attempted to administer such an amount." Johnson, 173 UAR at 7. 
What petitioner attacks, albeit in a roundabout fashion, is this 
court's correct conclusion that "attempted first degree murder [] 
is distinguishable under section 76-5-202(1) from attempted second 
degree murder [ ] by the presence of specified objective aggravating 
circumstances. . . . " Id. 
Why petitioner chose to challenge this basic elementary 
is unclear. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202 (1990) with UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (1990). Nevertheless, petitioner invites this 
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court, once again,1 to hold that § 76-4-101(3)(b)'s rejection of 
the impossibility defense somehow eliminates the basic due process 
provision codified in § 76-5-101 that M[n]o person is guilty of an 
offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law." In the instant 
case, the conduct prohibited by law is an attempt to cause the 
death of another by administering a poison or a lethal substance, 
or administering a substance in a lethal amount. Because the state 
failed to prove that oxalic acid is a poison or that it was 
administered lethally, it did not meet every element of attempted 
first degree murder. C£. State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1988). 
Therefore, this court was correct in reversing defendant's 
conviction and ordering that a judgment of conviction for attempted 
second degree murder be entered against her. See Johnson, 173 UAR 
at 8. 
Petitioner relies on State v. Pappas, 707 P.2d 1169, 1172 
(Utah 1989) for the proposition that the legislature intended "to 
punish subjective criminality so long as it is linked with some 
otherwise harmless corroborative act that demonstrates the firmness 
of the actor's criminal resolve." Petitioner argues, therefore, 
that under the attempt statute, an actor's subjective mental state 
1
 Petitioner has earlier raised this argument in its Brief and 
this Court has rejected the argument. See Johnson, 173 UAR at 7. 
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is the primary determinant of criminal liability, and the level of 
punishment imposed depends on the degree of culpability associated 
with a particular mental state," Petition for Rehearing, at 6. In 
other words, because defendant had a subjective intent to 
administer a fatal dosage of oxalic acid to her husband, then the 
state is somehow relieved of the clear and unambiguous burden 
imposed on it to show that the homicide attempted was to have been 
"committed by means of the administration of a poison or of any 
lethal substance or of any substance administered in a lethal 
dosage or quantity," UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(n), in order to 
elevate attempted second degree murder to attempted first degree 
murder. 
Respondent does not doubt the correctness of the view 
that the legislature intended to punish subjective criminality. 
However, punishing subjective criminality is a question distinct 
and separate from whether the legislature intended to punish for a 
crime not committed. See State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 728 (Utah 
1984) ("for an act to constitute a crime, the act must be 
prohibited and the defendant must have possessed a culpable or 
criminal state of mind"). In the instant case, the state has 
clearly shown that defendant had a subjective criminal intent and 
manifested an overt act in violation of the attempted second degree 
murder statute. However, the state did not show the latter 
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element^ i.e., an overt act of using a poison or a lethal 
substance, to warrant a conviction under the attempted first degree 
murder statute. That is precisely why this court directed the 
entry of a judgment of conviction on attempted second degree murder 
against defendant. 
Petitioner, therefore, is entirely mistaken in believing 
that the attempt statute or Pappas has virtually eliminated the 
presence of an aggravating factor from the elements of attempted 
first degree murder.2 Neither Pappas nor the attempt statute deals 
specifically with the critical issue before this court, namely, 
whether the presence of an aggravating factor is a condition 
precedent to finding a person guilty of attempted first degree murder.3 
If that were the case, respondent sees no reason why the 
legislature will differentiate between Attempted First Degree 
Murder and Attempted Second Degree Murder. 
3
 It is clear that one is guilty of attempt to commit a crime 
only "if, acting with the kind of culpability required for the 
commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward the commission of the offense." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-4-101(1) (1990) (emphasis added). The prohibited conduct 
in the instant case is, as stated before, the killing of another by 
means of a poison or a lethal substance. Therefore, the 
requirement that the murder be committed by a poison to qualify as 
first, rather than second, degree murder is an irreducible minimum 
under the statute; otherwise, § 76-5-202 will violate the basic 
precepts of In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that no conviction 
can stand unless the State prove every element of an offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
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Respondent submits the instant petition is a result of 
petitioner's misinterpretation of this court's holding in State v. 
Johnson. The misinterpretation stems from petitioner's belief 
that, because the amount of oxalic acid administered to the victim 
was insufficient to kill him, then this court must have 
countenanced the erroneous view that factual impossibility is a 
defense to the first degree attempted murder charge. In fact, to 
the contrary, this court clearly agreed with the state that factual 
impossibility is no defense to attempt offenses. See Johnson, 173 
UAR, at 7. 
Petitioner's erroneous interpretation of the Johnson 
opinion, in turn, stems apparently from the fact that the defense 
of impossibility -- to the extent that such a defense actually 
exists -- coalesced in the instant case with another defense, 
namely, insufficiency of the evidence adduced to aggravate a second 
degree attempt to a first degree attempted murder. However, it is 
the latter, not the former, defense that this court correctly held 
barred defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder. 
See Johnson, 173 UAR at 7 ("[Wjhere the charge is attempted first 
degree murder, which is distinguishable under § 76-5-202(1) from 
attempted second degree murder only by the presence of specified 
objective aggravation of circumstances, the legislature must have 
intended that the aggravating circumstance actually be present. 
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Therefore, [. . . absence] of an aggravating circumstance is 
required by § 76-5-202(1) would be a defense to a charge of 
attempted first degree murder.11). 
The following hypothetical further highlights 
petitioner's error and demonstrates the soundness of this court's 
decision. In addition, the hypothetical will demonstrate that the 
"defense of impossibility" is distinct and separate from the 
defense of insufficiency of the evidence under § 76-5-202(1)(n). 
Suppose the defendant asks B, pursuant to an agreement, 
to kill C, the defendant's husband. Suppose further that B shot C 
several times in the chest. However, unbeknown to B, C had already 
been killed by D. Suppose the defendant was charged with attempted 
first degree murder under the aggravating circumstance of 
flengag[ing] or employ[ing] another person to commit the homicide 
pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration. . . . " UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(g). In such a case, the defendant cannot 
be heard to argue that, because her husband was not actually killed 
by B, she should not be found guilty of attempted first degree 
murder. Pursuant to § 76-4-101(3)(b), factual impossibility is not 
a defense to the attempted crime of first degree murder. Cf. 
People v. LeeKono, 95 Cal. 666; 30 P. 800 (1892) (factual 
impossibility not a defense, where defendant shot with intent to 
kill police officer but failed because the officer had left the 
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place where defendant believed he was); see also LaFave & Scott, 
Substantive Criminal Law, §6.3, at 40 (1986) ("factual 
impossibility, where the intended substantive crime is impossible 
of accomplishment merely because of some physical impossibility not 
known to the defendant, is not a defense").4 
Suppose, however, that the defendant argues, instead, 
that the evidence was insufficient to find her guilty of first 
degree attempted murder. Can the state be heard to argue that, 
because the defendant had a subjective criminal intent to kill her 
husband, the state need not prove that there was in fact an 
agreement or contract between her and B, as is clearly required by 
§ 76-5-202(1)(g)? The answer is "No." If the state cannot show an 
agreement in fact between the defendant and B, then there can be no 
conviction for attempted first degree murder. That, precisely, was 
the holding of this court in State v. Johnson, and it is the 
correct decision. 
In short, it is obvious that the legislature clearly and 
unambiguously intended that the aggravating circumstances 
enumerated in subsections (a) to (q) of § 76-5-202(1) be present 
4
 Similarly, in the Johnson case, that Danny Johnson was not 
killed by the oxalic acid administered to him does not bar 
defendant's conviction for attempted first degree murder. This 
Court agreed with the soundness of this proposition. See Johnson, 
173 UAR, at 7. 
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before a homicide can be elevated to first degree murder and, a 
fortiori, attempted homicide to attempted first degree murder. 
That the legislature rejected the defense of impossibility under 
the attempt statute does not lead to a conclusion that the 
statutory elements of a specific offense ought not be proven by the 
state. If the legislature actually intended to relieve the state 
of the burden of proving the aggravating circumstances of § 76-5-
202(1) in attempted murder cases — a move which respondent 
strongly believes will be unconstitutional5 -- it would have 
specifically stated that failure to prove an aggravating 
circumstance is not a defense to first degree attempted murder. 
See, e.g., Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 
906 (Utah 1984) (best evidence of legislature's intent and purpose 
is plain statutory language). Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101(3) 
(1990) (legislative intent clearly delineating factors that do not 
constitute defense to attempt charge). 
Accordingly, this court should dismiss the instant 
Petition for Rehearing and not disturb its well-reasoned decision 
in State v. Johnson, 173 UAR 7. 
5
 See supra, note 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this court should dismiss the 
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of December, 1991. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Response to Petition for Rehearing, 
this day of December, 1991, to David B. Thompson and Charlene 
Barlow, Assistant Attorneys General, at 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114. 
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